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This dissertation explores the interaction of government policy and marital decisions. 
In the first chapter, I estimate the effect a Vietnam War era marriage deferment on 
marriage rates of men eligible for the draft. Previous studies often find that in the United 
States government policies that alter marital incentives have small or insignificant effects 
on marriage.   These results may be the product of weak incentives. To test this, I study a 
policy with stronger incentives -- the Vietnam War marriage deferments.   I find that the 
marriage deferments accelerated the timing of marriage for draft eligible men, for 
instance, increasing the probability of marriage at age 21 by 15%. I also find that it 
induced marginal marriages, marriages that would not have occurred without the 
deferment, increasing the probability of marrying by age 30 by 1%.   These results 
indicate that marital decisions can be responsive to government policies but only if the 
incentives are quite large.  In addition, I find that those exposed to the marriage 
deferment had a 1% lower probability of divorce, suggesting that policy induced 
marriages may not necessarily be more likely to end in divorce. 
In the second chapter, I describe the characteristics of spousal immigrants, how they 
compare to other immigrants and how they contribute to the distribution of new legal 
permanent residents. In 2012, 48% of all new legal permanent residents obtained green 
cards through marriage.  Yet, very little is known about these spousal immigrants and 
how they influence the overall distribution of new immigrants.  In this chapter, I explore 
the characteristics of spousal immigrants, how they compare to the characteristics of their 
spouses and the importance of accounting for spousal immigrants when considering 
changes to immigration policy.  I find that there is a lot of variation in the characteristics 
of spousal immigrants, but that they are very similar to their spouses across the 
dimensions of age, education, and nationality.  This implies that any changes to 
immigration law that alter the characteristics of principals will be amplified by the 
changes in the characteristics of their spouses. 
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1 Chapter 
 
Spousal Immigrants: 
Who Marries Into the United States? !
! ! !1!
1 Introduction 
The Immigration Act of 1965 transformed U.S. immigration policy by replacing country-
specific quotas with a rationing system that emphasized family unification. Since then 
policy makers and academics alike have debated the merits of family-preference 
immigration.1 Many have argued that the emphasis on kinship results in a relatively large 
proportion of new immigrants with low skills.  Policy makers have repeatedly attempted 
to remedy this by altering the selection mechanism for new immigrants. Specifically, the 
last three immigration reform bills have attempted to implement a point system, under 
which immigrants would be selected based on education, experience, language skills and 
age.2 Under the current system, only 10% of all new legal permanent residents are subject 
to any educational or experience requirements.3 The requirements for the remaining 90% 
are solely based on family ties, through either blood or marriage. While parents, siblings, 
children and spouses are often lumped together into the category of “family-based” 
immigrants, unlike other family-based immigrants spouses are selected through a 
marriage market. A priori, it is unclear that the characteristics of spousal immigrants will 
be the same as parent, sibling or children immigrants. This paper will describe the 
characteristics of spousal immigrants, compared to other immigrants, compared to the 
spouses who sponsor them and across admissions category.  Additionally, this paper will 
explore their role in the impact of policy changes on immigrant characteristics by 
conducting counterfactual exercises of potential policies.   
As seen in Figure 1 below, spousal immigrants make up approximately 48% of all new 
legal permanent residents. Given that they comprise such a large percentage, they have a 
substantial influence over the distribution of new immigrant characteristics. Yet, there 
has been very little research describing their overall characteristics or how they contribute 
to the distribution of new legal permanent residents.   
This paper will expand on this literature, in two ways, by identifying the characteristics of 
all spousal immigrants, including accompanying spouses, and by illuminating how those 
characteristics contribute to the overall characteristics of new green card holders.  To 
date, the research conducted describing the characteristics of spousal immigrants has 
focused solely on male spouses of U.S. Citizens.  This research finds that while they have 
lower earnings or work in lower earning occupations than employment-based 
immigrants, but have stronger earnings growth (Jasso 1995, Duleep & Regets 1996).  
While spousal immigrants are often lumped in with other family based immigrants, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Chiswick!(1981),!Duleep!(2013)!
2!The!Comprehensive!Immigration!Reform!Act!of!2006!(S.!2611),!Secure!Borders,!Economic!Opportunity!
and!Immigration!Reform!Act!of!2007,!(S.!1348),!Border!Security,!Economic!Opportunity,!and!Immigration!
Modernization!Act!of!2013!(S.!744)!
3!INS!Yearbook!2012.!Table!7:!Persons!obtaining!legal!permanent!resident!status!by!type!and!detailed!
class!of!admission:!Fiscal!Year!2012.!Excludes!refugees,!asylees,!and!legalizations!from!the!total.!Diversity!
immigrants!are!subject!to!educational!or!skill!criteria!but!they!are!much!less!stringent!than!employment!
preference!immigrants!and!only!require!the!immigrant!have!at!least!a!high!school!degree.! 
!
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spousal immigrants are generally much younger, more educated and more likely to be 
employed than other family-based immigrants. This may reflect the fact that unlike other 
family based immigrants they are selected through the marriage market.  
Figure 1: Distribution of New Legal Permanent Residents. (INS Yearbook 2012.  
Excludes refugees, asylees and legalizations.) 
 
While all spousal immigrants enter the United States through marriage, there are different 
paths for spousal immigrants to obtain green cards. As seen in Figure 1, most enter as 
spouses of U.S. Citizens; this is the largest admissions category by far.  A small number 
enter as spouses of Legal Permanent Residents (LPR) already residing in the United 
States. Finally, some enter as accompanying spouses to principal immigrants, for instance 
as a spouse of an employment-based immigrant. Thus, although all spousal immigrants 
are selected through a marriage market, the marriage market in which they were selected 
and the characteristics they were selected on may vary greatly by admissions category. In 
this paper, I find substantial variation in characteristics across different admissions 
categories.  This variation reflects the selection mechanism of the admissions category.  
For instance, accompanying spouses of employment-based immigrants, selected on 
education and skill, have higher levels of education and accompanying spouses of 
diversity-based immigrants, selected from traditionally low immigration countries, are 
more likely to be from low immigration countries.  
The characteristics of spousal immigrants likely reflect the admissions category’s 
selection mechanism because of assortative mating.  This would be consistent with 
previous research on assortative mating among immigrants. Kelly & Dalmia (2010) 
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found evidence of positive assortative mating along the dimensions of age and education 
for foreign-born to native-born and foreign-born to foreign-born marriages in the United 
States. While this presents a case for assortative mating among spousal immigrants, the 
population used in estimation includes more than just spousal immigrants, e.g. temporary 
non-immigrants and marriages that occurred after immigration. Jasso (2000) also finds 
evidence of positive assertive mating along the dimension of education for new legal 
permanent residents using the pilot version of the New Immigrant survey. In this paper, I 
extend the work of Jasso (2000) beyond education to examine country of origin, age, and 
employment.  In addition, by using the full 2003 NIS data set, I am able to look at the 
relative characteristics of immigrants and their spouse across admissions category.  I find 
immigrants and their spouses are strikingly similar along the dimensions of age, 
education, and country of origin for all admissions categories.  While, under most 
categories of admission, the evidence suggests assortative mating along the dimension of 
employment, the exception is employment-based immigrants, whose spouses are much 
less likely to work.  This could reflect cultural differences in division of labor within a 
marriage, or a temporary visa policy which restricts the employment of spouses of those 
with temporary employment visa.   
Spousal immigrants play an important role in the impacts of policy change, not only 
because they are such a large proportion of new immigrants, but also because a high 
proportion of principal immigrants bring accompanying spouses. In order, to illustrate 
their importance, I will conduct three counterfactual exercises of potential policy reforms 
that have been proposed in the last three immigration reform bills. The first exercise will 
increase the number of employment-based immigrants. Since in my sample almost 80% 
of employment-based immigrants bring accompanying spouses, the size of the changes to 
the overall distribution largely depends on the characteristics of the spouses.  For 
instance, most employment-based immigrants are male, therefore increasing the number 
would tend to increase the proportion of new immigrants that are male. However, since 
most of them also bring accompanying spouses, the change in the distribution of gender 
is almost zero. The next exercise looks at the results of removing spouses and children 
from an admission categories quota.  The final exercise implements a point system, 
which demonstrates that the selection mechanism imposed on principal immigrants will 
be reflected in the characteristics of their spouses. The results demonstrate that spousal 
immigrants, in general, mirror the characteristics of principal immigrants.   
This paper will explore the characteristics of spousal immigrants and how they influence 
the distribution of new legal permanent residents.  The first section in this paper will 
describe the quotas and the selection mechanisms imposed by the current immigration 
policy, which play an important role in determining the characteristics of immigrants.  
Next, I will describe the New Immigrant Survey, the unique data set that was used in this 
paper. The following sections will describe the characteristics of spousal immigrants 
compared to other immigrants, compared to their spouses and across categories.  These 
sections will demonstrate that spousal immigrants are unique in the broad category of 
“family-based” immigrants and that their characteristics largely reflect the selection 
mechanisms of their admission category due to assortative mating.  Finally, three 
counterfactual exercises of potential policy reforms will be conducted, in order to 
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illustrate the importance of spousal immigrants in determining the effect of a policy 
change.  
2 Legal Permanent Visas 
An immigrant can qualify for a legal permanent visa, or green card, through several 
different categories.  These categories of green cards vary in their eligibility requirements 
and the size of their quota. As seen in Table 1, immigrants who qualify for visas as 
spouses of U.S. Citizens, parents of U.S. Citizens or children of U.S. Citizen do not face 
any quotas.  These immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens comprise 55% of all new legal 
permanent residents, with spouses of U.S. Citizens being the largest category by far at 
35%. The remaining categories are all subject to quotas; approximately 52% of the quota 
is allotted for other family-based immigrants, 35% for employment-based immigrants 
and 13% for diversity-based immigrants, a lottery based category for immigrants from 
countries with traditionally low immigration rates. While family-based immigrants must 
be related to either a U.S. Citizen or Legal Permanent Resident already in the United 
States, they are not subject to any other eligibility requirements.  In contrast, 
employment-based immigrants are selected based on their education, experience and 
occupation. Even diversity lottery green cards, which serve to increase the diversity of 
the nationalities of the immigrant population, require that an immigrant have at least a 
high school education or a certain skill level.  
Table 1: Green Card Categories 
 
While spouses of U.S. Citizens and spouses of Legal Permanent Residents make up 
approximately 38% of all new legal permanent residents, they are not the only 
immigrants who obtain visas through marriage.  Approximately 15% of new immigrants 
obtain visas as accompanying spouses. When a foreign born person qualifies for a green 
Category Quota  2012 Eligibility 
Spouse of U.S. Citizen No Quota 273,429 Married to a U.S. Citizen 
Child of U.S. Citizen No Quota 81,003 Child of U.S. Citizen 
Parent of U.S. Citizens No Quota 124,210 Parent of U.S. Citizen (18+) 
Spouse/Child of LPR 88,000 87,602 Spouse or Child (<21) of LPR 
Unmarried Children of 
LPRs 
26,250 12,095 Unmarried Child (21+) of LPR 
Unmarried Child of U.S. 
Citizens 
23,400 12,802 Unmarried Child (21+) of U.S. 
Citizen 
Married Child of U.S. 
Citizens 
23,400 21,747 Married Child of U.S. Citizen 
Sibling of U.S. Citizens 65,000 59,898 Sibling of U.S. Citizen 
Employment Preference 154,000 143,720 Education, Experience, Skill  
Diversity Preference 55,000 40,320 Country of Origin, Education, 
Skill  
! ! !5!
card to enter the United States, they may also obtain green cards for their spouses and 
children. These accompanying spouses and children count against the quota. For instance, 
a family consisting of a husband, wife and two kids, where the wife receives an 
employment preference green card, will consume four of the green cards allotted for 
employment-based immigrants.  
Figure 2: Distribution of Quota by Class of Admission  
 
Figure 1 above illustrates the distribution of quota’d green cards between principals, 
those who qualify for the green card, and their accompanying spouses and children.  This 
implies that although 154,000 visas are allotted to employment immigrants in 2012, only 
48% of them went to principal immigrants; the majority of the quota actually goes to 
their spouses and children. 
 
3 Data 
In this paper, I utilize the New Immigrant Survey (NIS-2003-1), the baseline survey for a 
broader panel survey of new legal permanent residents.  The sample is a representative 
sample of new legal permanent residents who obtained their visas between May 2003 and 
November 2003.  The sample of respondents was selected based on administrative data 
from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and oversampled employment-
based immigrants and diversity immigrants.  Each respondent was surveyed within seven 
months of receiving his or her legal permanent visa in his or her preferred language.  
Respondents could either be principal immigrants or accompanying spouses.  Each 
respondent was asked about the education, language skills, employment, age and gender 
of themselves and their spouse.  A supplemental survey was also conducted with the 
spouses of the respondent which covered similar topics.  In addition to the basic 
information collected, a wide range of data including health information, employment 
history, migration history and household roster are collected for each respondent.   
! 6!
4 Characteristics of Spousal Immigrants 
In the 2003 New Immigrant Survey data set, spousal immigrants comprised 57% of all 
new legal permanent residents over the age of 17.4  As such, their characteristics are 
weighted more than other family-based immigrants, employment-based immigrants or 
diversity-based immigrants. As seen in Figures 4 and 5, the result is that while spousal 
immigrants differ substantially from the other categories of immigrants along almost 
every dimension, their characteristics are almost identical to those of immigrants as a 
whole.  Figures 3, 4 and 5, clearly demonstrate the importance of spousal immigrants in 
determining the overall characteristics of immigrants.  While employment-based 
principal immigrants have very high employment rates, they only comprise 9% of the 
sample and therefore, they have relatively little weight on the overall distribution of 
characteristics.  Similar to immigrants overall, spousal immigrants are predominantly 
females around working age (24-44 years old) from a diverse set of countries.  Most 
spousal immigrants have at least a high school degree and more than a third have at least 
a college degree. They have a relatively low rate of labor force participation; almost a 
third are out of the labor force. Of those in the labor force, approximately seventy five 
percent are already employed within seven months of obtaining their legal permanent 
resident status.  While the characteristics of spousal immigrants are clearly reflected in 
the overall characteristics of immigrants, their characteristics are distinctly different from 
other groups of immigrants along almost every dimension.   
Figure 3: Distributions of New Legal Permanent Residents (NIS 2003, Adults) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!This!is!consistent!with!the!INS!yearbook!from!2003,!once!!
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Figure 4: Spousal Immigrants vs. Other Immigrants: Gender, Age and Country of Origin (NIS 2003, 
Immigrants ≥18) 
 
Figure 5: Spousal Immigrants vs. Other Immigrants: Education & Employment 
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4.1 Compared to Other Immigrants 
Although they are often grouped with other family-based immigrants, spousal immigrants 
differ substantially from other family-based immigrants along almost every dimension 
depicted in Figures 4 and 5.  While similar in terms of gender, spousal immigrants are 
much younger and come from a more diverse set of regions. They, also, have much 
higher levels of education; more than 35% of spousal immigrants have at least a college 
education compared to less 18% of other family-based immigrants. Not only are they 
more likely to participate in the labor force, of those in the labor force they are more 
likely to be employed. These results suggest that spousal immigrants should not 
necessarily be lumped in with other family-based immigrants.  While other family-based 
immigrants are born into eligibility, spousal immigrants are indirectly selected through 
the marriage market. 
The characteristics of spousal immigrants are also distinctly different than employment or 
diversity based immigrants.  Since employment-based immigrants are selected on 
employment and education, it is not surprising that they have higher levels of education 
and employment than spousal immigrants.  In addition, they are much more likely to be 
males from Asian countries. When compared to diversity-based immigrants, who are 
select from countries that have traditionally low immigration rates, spousal immigrants 
are less likely to come from one of these traditionally low immigration areas, like Europe 
or Africa. Diversity-based immigrants are, also, selected on education although to a much 
lower degree than employment-based immigrants.  Their resulting levels of education are 
very similar although slightly higher than those of spousal immigrants. When compared 
to other groups of immigrants, spousal immigrant’s characteristics fall somewhere 
between those of employment or diversity-based immigrants and other family-based 
immigrants. 
4.2 Across Admissions Categories 
While the conclusions in the above section hold, in general, combining spousal 
immigrants into one group masks substantial variation in their characteristics. In fact, the 
overall characteristics of spousal immigrants, largely reflects the characteristics of 
Spouses of U.S. Citizens. This admissions category makes up more than 57% of all 
spousal immigrants. Their characteristics, therefore, drive the aggregate characteristics of 
spousal immigrants.  As seen in Figure 7, the characteristics of the spousal immigrants 
align closely with those admitted under the category Spouses of U.S. Citizens. 
! ! !9!
Figure 6: Distribution of Spousal Immigrants Across Admissions Categories  
(NIS 2003, Spousal Immigrants 18 years and older) 
 
The characteristics of other spousal immigrants largely reflect the selection mechanism 
for their visa category.  Parents of U.S. Citizens are likely to be older and closer to 
retirement since the U.S. Citizen children sponsoring them must be at least 18 years of 
age.  As seen in Figure 8 below, the characteristics of their spouses reflect this selection 
mechanism; they are much older and much more likely to be out of the labor force than 
the average spousal immigrant.  Employment-based immigrants are selected based on 
education, which is reflected in their spouses having much higher levels of education than 
the average spousal immigrants.  Similarly, diversity immigrants must be from countries 
with low rates of immigration to the United States, mainly from European, African and 
Middle Eastern countries. Spouses of diversity immigrants similarly are much more 
likely to be from these European, African or  
Spouse!of!
U.S.!Ci\zen!
57%!
Spouse!of!
LPR!
4%!
Parent!of!
U.S.!Ci\zen!
7%!
Fourth!
Family!
Preference!
7%!
Employment!
Preference!
12%!
Diversity!
Preference!
8%!
Married!
Children!of!
U.S.!Ci\zens!
5%!
! 10!
Figure 7: All Spousal Immigrants vs. Spouses of U.S. Citizens (NIS 2003, Spousal Immigrants, ≥18 years old) 
 
Figure 8: All Spousal Immigrants vs. Spouses of Parents of U.S. Citizens  
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Figure 9: All Spousal Immigrants vs. Spouses of Employment Preference Immigrants (NIS 2003, Spousal 
Immigrants, ≥18 years old) 
 
Figure 10: All Spousal Immigrants vs. Spouses of Diversity Preference Immigrants  
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Middle Eastern countries.5  These results suggest that by selecting a principal immigrant 
on certain characteristics, an admission criterion appears to also select a spousal 
immigrant with similar characteristics, due to assortative mating. 
 
4.3 Compared to Their Spouses 
 
Just as the above analysis suggests, I find evidence of assortative mating along almost 
every demographic characteristic regardless of the type of spousal immigrant. As seen in 
Appendix A2, in almost every visa category, spousal immigrants are similar in age, 
education, birth country and employment to their spouse. The strongest divergence is for 
classes of admission that have the largest gender differences between the principal and 
their spouse.  If men are much more likely to be the principal, spouses tend to be slightly 
younger and have lower levels of employment.   The difference in rates of employment 
can be substantial, even though there is almost no difference in education levels.  
Although this may be the result of cultural or childbearing decisions, it may also be the 
result of temporary visa restrictions on spouses. While temporary visa holders are 
allowed to bring their spouses with them to the United States, their spouses are not 
allowed to work.  The largest difference is seen for spouses of employment preferences, 
immigrants in this category are also the most likely to have already been in the U.S. on a 
temporary visa just prior to receiving their green cards. This might explain why their 
spouses have such low rates of employment within 6 months of receiving their green 
card. 
 
5 Impact of Potential Policies 
 
Over the last decade, congress has introduced three senate bills, which have attempted to 
reform immigration policy.  Each has proposed major changes to the legal permanent 
resident visa program, emphasizing a shift from family-based immigration to 
employment-based immigration. Some of the proposed changes include increasing the 
number of employment based-immigrants, excluding accompanying spouses and children 
from the quota or implementing a point system.  In this section, I demonstrate the role of 
spouses in the result of each of these changes.   
 
As discussed in Section II, each of the admissions categories is distinguished by the size 
of the quota as well as its eligibility requirements.  The equations below explicitly 
demonstrate how quotas and accompanying spouses and children effect the overall 
distribution of characteristics.  The average of any characteristic, X, of all immigrants can 
be written as: 
 
X=Σik ωik Xik, for all i and k 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!In!2003,!the!following!countries!were!ineligible!for!diversity!lotteries:!Canada,!China,!the!Dominican!
Republic,!El!Salvador,!Haiti,!India,!Jamaica,!Mexico,!the!Philippines,!South!Korea,!the!United!Kingdom!
(excluding!Northern!Ireland)!and!its!dependent!territories,!Vietnam,!Colombia,!and!Pakistan.!Since!2003,!
the!list!has!changed.!!!
! ! !13!
 
where Xik is the average characteristic within admissions category, i, for immigrant type 
(principal, accompanying spouse or accompanying child), k and ω represents the weight 
for that admissions category and immigrant type.   
 
For each admissions category and immigrant type, the average characteristic is a function 
of the eligibility requirements they face such that: 
 
Xik=Σj Xj if Xj for all immigrants, j, in category i of immigrant type k 
 
The weight for each admissions category and immigrant type is a function of the size of 
the quota for the admissions category, the total number of the immigrants, and the rates at 
which principal immigrants bring accompanying spouses and children.  The weights for 
each admissions category and immigrant type can be written as: 
ωik=(qi/T) x αik 
αik= βik/(βip+ βiS+ βiC), βip=1 
T=Σi qi 
where q represents the number of people entering under admission category i and α 
represents the proportion that are immigrant type, k, for admission category, i, and βik is 
the rate at which principals bring immigrant type, k, for admission category, i.   
In order to conduct this policy exercise, there are several caveats, assumptions and 
restrictions that are made.  The first is that the analysis is limited to individuals over the 
age of 18 years old, as it has been throughout this paper. While the effect of these policy 
changes on the characteristics of children would be an interesting exercise, educational 
attainment and employment could not be meaningful compared for this group.   The 
second is that since this analysis utilizes information on immigrants who are receiving 
their green cards in 2003, it must be assumed that the size and characteristics of each 
admission category have not changed since 2003.  Further, while some research has 
presented evidence of small spill over effects, predicting spillover effects is outside the 
scope of this paper.6  In addition, the analysis below assumes that there is always demand 
for more visas.  This is not a strong assumption given the lengthy waiting lists for each 
admission category.  Finally, I assume that the characteristics of new immigrants entering 
under a certain admission category have the same average characteristics as the 
immigrants in my sample entering under the same category and as the same type of 
immigrant (principal, accompanying spouse or accompanying child).  This includes the 
assumption that the rates at which principals bring accompanying spouse and 
accompanying children are both constant within a category.   
 
5.1 Quadruple Employment Quota 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!Wadwa!(2007)!
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One of the most commonly suggested changes to immigration policy is to increase the 
size of the quota for employment based immigrants.  Such a change could have large 
effects on the characteristics of immigrants as a whole. In order to explore the impacts of 
this change and the role that spouses play, I will conduct a policy exercise where I 
quadruple the size of the employment preference category. While all of the immigration 
bills have proposed increases to the quota for employment preference immigrants, these 
increases are often tied to changes in other categories.  In order to isolate the effect of 
increasing this category alone, the exercise quadruples the size of the category.7  The 
resulting percent of employment immigrants is similar to the percent of employment 
immigrants predicted after the 2013 CIR has been in place.8  
 
Figure 11: Distribution of Visas: Increasing Employment Quota. 
 
 
Quadrupling the quota for employment preference will not change the average 
characteristics of employment based immigrants, based on my assumptions, but it will 
change its weight in determining the characteristics of immigrants as a whole. By 
increasing the quota for employment-based immigrant the weight for this group is altered 
such that:  
ωEk=(4qE/T’) x αEk for k=Principal, Spouse 
T’=T+3qE 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!See!Appendix!A3!for!the!effect!of!doubling!the!employment!preference!quota.!
8!Migration!Policy!Institute.!Issue!Brief!No.!3.!(April!2013)!
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where T’ is the new total number of immigrants and E represents employment preference.  
From the equation above it is clear to see that quadrupling the employment preference 
quota, not only increases the weight for principal immigrants but also for their 
accompanying spouses. Thus the weight on the characteristics of accompanying spouses 
will also quadruple.  An important factor for this analysis is that βES is approximately 0.8 
in my data set.  Assuming that the rate of bringing accompanying spouses is the same for 
all new employment preference principals as current employment preference principals, 
for every ten additional employment preference principals that enter, an additional eight 
accompanying spouses will also enter.  The weight on the characteristics of employment 
principals jumps from 0.09 to 0.23 and the weight on the characteristics of their spouses 
jumps from 0.07 to 0.19.   
 
The size of this change to overall immigrant characteristics will not only depend on the 
change in the weight, but the characteristics of employment preference principals and 
spouses relative to the current average and to each other. As demonstrated in Appendix 
A1 and Appendix A2, there is substantial variation in characteristics among immigrants 
across different classes of admission. Principal employment immigrants tend to differ 
drastically from other immigrants along the dimensions of gender, country of origin, 
education and employment.  Spouses of employment immigrants, in general, share many 
of the same characteristics; however they are much more likely to be female and are less 
likely to participate in the labor force or be employed.    
 
Figure 12 shows the results of quadrupling the number of employment preference quotas, 
separately for the principal alone and then for the principal and their spouse on education 
and employment.  Employment-based immigrants are selected based on education and 
experience; therefore it is unsurprising that when their quota is increased there is a shift 
in education and employment.  If only the number of principals is quadrupled, the results 
are that the percentage of immigrants with a college degree or higher jumps from 34% to 
41%. When accompanying spouses are also quadrupled, the percentage further jumps to 
44%, amplifying the results seen for just the principals.  In contrast, while employment 
jumps for principals alone from 58% to 63%, the effect is actually slightly dampened by 
adding accompanying spouses to 62%. 
 
In addition to altering education and employment, the increase in the employment quota 
could also change the distribution of gender, age and country of origin.  While 
employment preference principals are largely male, most also bring accompanying 
female spouses. Thus the result of increasing the number of employment preference 
quotas on gender is almost zero.     Both the results for age and country of origin are 
amplified by the accompanying spouses.  The above analysis demonstrates that the 
results of increasing the number of employment-based immigrants greatly depend the 
characteristics of their spouses.  While in most cases, their spouses appear to amplify the 
effects of increasing employment-based immigration, in others like gender and 
employment they can dampen the effects or eliminate them entirely. 
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Figure 12: Quadruple Employment-Based Quota, Panel 1 
 
Figure 13: Quadruple Employment-Based Quota - Panel 2 
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The 2013 immigration reform bill proposes that accompanying spouses and children no 
longer count against the quota for a visa category.  This alone may have a substantial 
impact on the distribution of immigrants. The new weight for each category and 
immigrant type would be: 
ωiP=(qi/T), ωiP=(βiSqi/T), ωiP=(βiCqi/T), 
T=Σi qi + Σi βiSxqi + Σi βiCxqi 
The effect would almost double the number of adult new legal permanent residents in 
some categories with high marriage rates, like the employment-based category or married 
children of U.S. Citizens, but would not affect other categories such as spouse of U.S. 
Citizen or unmarried child of U.S. Citizen. The figure below shows the change in 
distribution and size. The charts in Appendix A3 show that although there would be a 
change in the proportion of immigrants from different groups, the overall characteristics 
of immigrants would change very little.  
Figure 14: Eliminate Accompanying Spouses and Children from Visa Quota 
 
 
5.3 Implementing A Point System 
 
The last three immigration bills introduced to the Senate have all proposed implementing 
a point system.  Similar point systems are already in effect in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.  These point systems assign points to principal immigrants based on education, 
experience, age, language skills, country of origin and whether they have relatives in the 
United States.  This would greatly alter the selection mechanism for immigrants.  I apply 
the 2013 CIR bill’s Tier 1 point system to see how this system could affect the 
characteristics of new legal permanent residents. While the system will directly select 
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characteristics for principal immigrants, it could have an indirect effect on the 
characteristics of their spouses as well.   
 
As a first step, I apply the point system to principal immigrants.  They are assigned point 
values based on their age, level of education, English language proficiency, and work 
experience.  While it is unclear what the cut off would be in the case of a point system, I 
use a cut off that aligns with the Australian and Canadian point systems.  Under this point 
system, approximately 75% of the new legal permanent residents would not qualify for a 
visa.  Employment-based immigrants are the most likely to pass with 64% passing and 
Spouses of U.S. Citizens were the second most likely to pass with 17% passing.  Parents 
of U.S. Citizens and Spouses of Legal Permanent Residents were the least likely to pass 
with only 2-3% passing.   
 
While the effect of the point systems is obvious for some characteristics, it is not for 
others.  The point system ranks those with higher levels of education and experience the 
highest.  As seen in Figure 7 below, the application of the point system shifts the 
educational and employment distribution of new legal permanent residents up, selecting 
new legal permanent residents with higher levels of education and who are more likely to 
be employed.  Working age immigrants also receive higher points; this is reflected in the 
increased percentage of principals age 25-34.  Finally immigrants from countries with 
traditionally low immigration rates also receive extra points; the effect of this is relatively 
minor with slight increases in immigrants from Africa and Europe.   
 
While many of the changes reflect the point system directly, there are some indirect 
effects as well.  Most strikingly, there is a sharp decline in the percentage of principal 
immigrants from Latin America and the increase in the percentage that are male.   
 
In addition to altering the characteristics of principal immigrants, a point system would 
also alter the characteristics of their spouses.  As seen in the Figure 8 below, the 
characteristics of accompanying spouses also reflect the selection mechanisms outlined 
by the point system.  There is a shift in the distribution of education, increasing the 
proportion who have a bachelor’s degree or higher, and a shift in the age distribution, 
increasing the proportion of accompanying spouses who are working age.   The indirect 
effect on birth country is also reflected in the characteristics of spouses, with a smaller 
proportion from Latin America and a larger proportion from Asia.  In general, the 
changes in characteristics of accompanying spouses move in the same direction as those 
of the selected principal immigrants, the exceptions are for gender, where spouses are 
now much more likely to be female, and employment, which does not appear to change at 
all for spouses.  
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Figure 15: Application of Point System to Principals Only: Principal Characteristics 
 
Figure 16: Application of Points System to Principals Only: Spousal Characteristic 
 
The resulting characteristics of the new legal permanent residents are a combination of 
both the principals who are subject to the selection and their spouses.  As seen in Figures 
7 and 8, below, the changes in characteristics of principal immigrants and their 
accompanying spouses after applying a point system are strikingly similar along the 
dimensions of age, education and birth country.  Thus the overall characteristics of the 
new immigrant population are almost identical to the characteristics of the principals 
alone.  The exceptions are gender and employment.  Although the point system selects 
more men, most of those men are married and bring accompanying wives; the result is 
that there is relatively little change in the proportion of new legal permanent residents 
that are men.  While the overall proportion of new legal permanent residents that are 
employed increases, the increase is dampened by the lower employment rates of 
accompanying spouses.  
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Figure 17: Application of Point System to Principals Only: Overall Characteristics 
 
 
In this section, I have shown the importance of accounting for spouses of immigrants 
when considering the effect of changes in immigration law.  The 2013 CIR Bill proposes 
several of these changes simultaneously.  It will eliminate diversity visas and visas 
allotted to the siblings of U.S. Citizens and decrease the number of family based visas. As 
mentioned above, accompanying spouses and children will no longer count against the 
quota for any given class of admission. Additionally a point system will be implemented 
for employment based visas. Finally, spouses and children of legal permanent residents 
will no longer be subject to a quota.  
 
Taken as a whole it would be difficult to predict the effect of all of these changes.  While 
it appears that there will be fewer family-based visas and more highly selected 
employment-based immigrants, the provision which allows for unlimited entry of spouses 
and children of legal permanent residents could dwarf these other changes. A recent issue 
brief by the Migration Policy Institute estimates the new distribution of new legal 
permanent residents in 2018.  They estimate that employment and merit-based 
immigrants will make up 35-41% of new legal permanent residents.  While this is an 
increase from the current proportion, they predict family-based immigration will still 
make up 49-54% of new legal permanent residents.  While this appears to be a situation 
similar to the example I generate above where I quadrupled the number of employment-
based immigrants, the issue of predicting the characteristics of those immigrants is 
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substantially more complicated for several reasons.  One major complication is that by 
2018 the long waitlists that now characterize most of the categories subject to quotas will 
have been cleared. Since many of the new immigrants in this survey had waited for long 
periods of time on waitlists, its possible that there will be substantial changes to the 
characteristics of those who newly apply. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Spousal immigrants make up almost half of the new immigrant population in the United 
States.  As such a large portion of new legal permanent residents they drive the overall 
distribution of characteristics of immigrants. They tend to be working age females with at 
least a high school education, although there is substantial variation depending on their 
class of admission.  While spousal immigrants are not directly subject to eligibility 
requirements, the selection mechanisms for the categories under which they enter are 
reflected in their characteristics.  In general, they are very similar to their spouses along 
the dimensions of age, education and birth country. While they tend to have lower levels 
of employment, this may be the result of having already lived in the United States under a 
temporary visa, which restricts the employment of spouses.   In general, spouses of 
immigrants have very similar characteristics to principal immigrants and will, therefore, 
amplify any changes in characteristics of principals.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Chapter 
 
Incentives to Marry:  
Draft Deferments during the Vietnam War 
 
1 Introduction
Over the past couple of decades, the U.S. government has become increasingly involved
in the marriage market.1 In addition, many politicians have made marriage promotion an
important part of their political agendas.2 Cherlin (2003) discusses the ensuing debate over
whether government policies should encourage marriage. Proponents point to studies, such
as Waite and Gallagher (2000), which show that marriage is associated with positive out-
comes including better physical and mental health, higher income and better outcomes for
children. Those opposed argue that marriages induced by policy might be more likely to
end in divorce. This debate hinges on the answer to two important questions: are individ-
uals responsive to marriage promoting policies, and are marriages induced by government
policy more likely to end in divorce?
Economic theory predicts that the answer to each of these questions is “yes”. In Becker
(1973), he presents a model of marriage, in which men and women marry if the expected
utility of getting married outweighs the expected utility of staying single. In this context,
a policy which increases the value of marriage should lead to more marriages. According
to Becker et al. (1977), the smaller the expected gains from marriage the higher the prob-
ability of divorce. Marginal marriages, those which would not have occurred without the
implementation of the policy, will be more likely to end in divorce because they produce
the lowest gains to marriage.
In contrast to these theoretical considerations, existing empirical literature indicates that
in the United States individuals are fairly unresponsive to government policies which al-
ter marriage incentives. Alm and Whittington (1997, 1999) and Herbst (2011) find that
the marriage subsidies and penalties that currently exist in the tax code have a significant
effect on the timing and probability of marriage but the effects are very small. Similarly,
studies looking at other policies which alter the incentive to marry, such as the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunities Act (PRWORA) and Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF), find they have little or no effect on the decision to marry.3 This insen-
sitivity of the marriage decision may be explained by the relatively small magnitude of
the incentives. For instance, the strongest policy associated with PRWORA, is a marriage
1There are over 1,100 direct benefits of marriage created by the Federal government, including tax subsi-
dies, spousal health insurance coverage, etc. (Yakush 2007)
2President George W. Bush had marriage promotion at the forefront of his agenda when he took office in
2000. During his administration, TANF was reauthorized with $500 million in funding dedicated to block
grants to states for marriage promotion(Yakush 2007). In 2011 two of the GOP presidential candidates signed
the Marriage Leader Pledge, which includes a pledge to eliminate marriage penalties currently in effect.
3Donley and Wright (2008) look at the effect of marriage promoting policies enacted in states as a result
of PRWORA and find that these policies have no effect on marriage. In a review of papers examining the
effect of TANF on family formation, Moffitt (1997) finds that although a simple majority of studies find
a significant effect of TANF on marriage and fertility, these results are sensitive to methodology used and
specification. A sizable minority of these studies finds no effect at all and many that find a significant effect,
find a small effect.
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subsidy of $1,200 per year.4
To test this, I study a policy which provided much stronger marriage incentives, on the
order of $30,000.5 Specifically, I study the effects a Vietnam War marriage deferment.
This policy may alter marital decisions in two ways, by accelerating the timing of marriage
and by inducing marginal marriages, marriages that would not have occurred without the
policy. To study the impact on the timing of marriage, I estimate the effect of the marriage
deferment on the hazard of marriage, allowing the effect of the deferment to vary with
age. The results from this model show that the marriage deferment has strong effects on
the timing of marriage for draft eligible men, for example, the probability of marriage
at age 21 increases by 15%. As a robustness check, I estimate the effects of marriage
deferments available during the Korean War and World War II and find the same qualitative
results on the timing of marriage. In order to test whether the policy induced marginal
marriages, I estimate the effect of the marriage deferment on the probability of marrying
by age 30. I find that the marriage deferment has a positive and significant effect, increasing
the probability of marrying by age 30 by 1%. Further, the effect on both the timing and
probability of marriage appears to be strongest for those most vulnerable to induction into
the draft.6 Although these results show that government policies can both accelerate the
timing of marriage and induce marginal marriages, they also suggest that the incentives
have to be very large.
Although there is extensive literature which studies the effect of government policies on
marriage in the United States, few have examined the indirect effect on divorce.7 Those
that do, confound the effects of military related marriage policy and selection into the
military. The military provides marriage subsidies and benefits to military personnel, Zax
and Flueck (2003) and Hogan and Seifert (2008) study the effects of these subsidies and
benefits on marriage and divorce. They find that veterans are more likely to get married and
are more likely to divorce by comparing the marriage hazards and the probability of divorce
for veterans and civilians but do not control for selection into the military. In contrast, this
paper studies the effects of the Vietnam War marriage deferment on marriage and divorce
by exploiting cross cohort variation in eligibility for the marriage deferment. The results
show that the policy is associated with a lower probability of divorce by 1%, casting doubt
4Marriage penalties and subsidies in the tax code can be as large as $10,000 per year but depend on
income, with the large marriage subsidies and penalties being associated with the highest income.(Alm and
Whittington 1997, 1999)
5Rohlfs (2005) calculates the willingness to pay to avoid the draft and finds that it is between $30,000 and
$50,000 in 2003 dollars for white men during the Vietnam War, 1966-1973.
6For men with a college education, who likely had student deferments exempting them from the draft, the
marriage deferment had no effect. The effect of the marriage deferment is driven by men without a college
education, who were most vulnerable to induction.
7There is also a working paper which looks at the effect of a marriage subsidy in Austria. In Frimmel et al.
(2011) they study the effect of an announcement repealing marriage subsidies in Austria on marriage rates
and the divorce hazard. They find that the announced repeal of the subsidies caused a spike in the marriage
rates and a subsequent increase in the divorce hazard.
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Figure 1: Timeline: 1956-1980
on the standard marginal marriage hypothesis.
2 The Draft and Marriage Deferments
The Vietnam War draft was a government system which inducted men 19-25 years old into
the military.8 Once inducted men were required to serve two years on active duty and five
years on reserve duty. Rohlfs (2005) calculates the willingness to pay to avoid the draft and
finds that it is between $30,000 and $50,000 for white men during the Vietnam War. If a
man wanted to avoid military service he had to qualify for a deferment, which were avail-
able to students, married men, and fathers. These deferments provided strong incentives
for men to go to school, have children or get married. It has been well documented that
Vietnam War draft deferments for students and fathers affected the education and fertility
decisions of young men and women, yet the effects of marriage deferments on their marital
decisions has been largely ignored (Card and Lemieux 2001, Kutinova 2009).9
While the draft deferments for students and fathers were available for extended periods as
seen in the timeline in Figure 1, the marriage deferment was only available from Septem-
ber 1963 until August 1965. President Kennedy created the marriage deferment in 1963
in response to a surplus of inductees that resulted from a long period of peace and baby
boomers reaching the age of liability.10 The entry of the U.S. into the Vietnam War then
lead to a shortage of inductees, as a result in August 1965 President Johnson rescinded the
8The discussion in this section is based on Flynn (1993).
9U.S. House Committee on Armed Services (1966) pg. 10014-10015 looks at time series variation in raw
marriage rates for 19-25 year old over 4 quarters from June 1963- June 1964.
10A fatherhood deferment was created at the same time but this deferment was obsolete while the marriage
deferment was in effect, because in order to qualify men had to be married.
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Figure 2: Timeline: 1940-1980
deferments for married men.11
There were two other time periods with marriage deferments, during the Korean War (June
1948 - June 1951) and, during World War II (September 1940 - December 1941), as seen
in Figure 2. The Korean War and World War II marriage deferments were enacted and
repealed in much the same way as the VietnamWar deferment. TheWorldWar II deferment
for married men differed along one important dimension, the draft eligible age range.12
Specifically, the age of liability was 21-31 years old from 1940-1941 and 20-36 years old
from 1941-1942. The World War II and Korean War deferments provide the opportunity to
study how a marriage deferment affected different cohorts and different ages of liability.
3 Data
A 1% Public Use Microdata Sample from the 1960 and 1980 U.S. Census provides the
data for the estimations presented in this paper. This data set includes variables for marital
status, age and quarter of first marriage, current marital status and number of marriages. It
also includes demographic data relating to education, sex, race, veteran status, wage, labor
force participation, and number of children at the time of the survey.13
11Although, he had promised that those married by August 25th, 1965 would be able to maintain their
deferments through the remainder of the war, he later rescinded that statement.
12The marriage deferment for WWII was also under another name, hardship deferment, but provided the
same benefits to married men from 1940-1941. Specifically, all wives qualified as dependents and men did
not need to demonstrate hardship in order to qualify (Flynn 1993).
13Estimation is restricted to white men and women.
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4 Timing of Marriage
4.1 Estimation Strategy
The marriage deferment, when in place, provides clear incentives to alter the timing of
marriage for draft eligible men. Using an unbalanced panel for years 1956-1980 created
from the 1980 census, I estimate the effect of these incentives on age of marriage. I utilize
a discrete time transition model of getting married at age, a, where the hazard function is
defined by
l(a|Zb) = (1+ exp( Z(a)b)) 1,a= 17, ...,32 (1)
I allow the effect of the availability of the marriage deferment to vary with age. This
flexibility is important for two reasons. First, the availability of the marriage deferment
should only effect those men who are in the draft eligible age range, 19-25 years old. By
allowing the effect of the deferment to vary freely with age, the model provides a test of
this restriction. Second, induction into the draft was based on age, with the oldest men
within the ages of liability drafted first. This implies that the effect of the deferment will
likely vary with age, with the effect being strongest for those ages most vulnerable to
draft induction. The flexibility of the following specification allows the model to capture
heterogenous effects by age. Another dimension on which the effects might vary is by war
status. In order to capture this, I allow the effect of the marriage deferment to vary with
war status. This leads to the following specification for Z(a)b:
Z(a)b=MDPeacei,t bMa +MDWari,t bMWa +Wari,tbWi,t +PostWari,tbPWi,t +X 0a,i,tbx
where t represents calendar time, a represents age, i represents the individual, bka is an
age specific coefficient on variable k, MDPeacei,t is an indicator for availability of a marriage
deferment during peacetime, MDWari,t is an indicator for availability of a deferment during
wartime,Wari,t is an indicator for wartime, PostWari,t is an indicator for the year after war,
Xa,i,t includes a set of age dummies, year dummies, quarter dummies and state dummies.
The coefficients on the marriage deferment indicators, the war indicator, and the post war
indicator are all allowed to vary freely with age.
The above model will consistently estimate the effect of the deferment as long as con-
ditional independence holds. I condition on both year and age identify the effect of the
marriage deferment off of variation in availability of the deferment across quarters within
years.14 Although the model implicitly assumes homogenous treatment effects within age
and war status, it is robust to unobserved heterogeneous treatment effects. Since availabil-
14For instance, the marriage deferment was repealed in October of 1965, this implies that a 23 year old in
the 3rd quarter of 1965 should be affected, but a 23 year old in the 4th quarter of 1965 should not.
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Figure 3: The Marriage Deferment Accelerated Marriage
ity of the deferment is universal, if there are unobserved heterogenous treatment effects,
the estimates from the model above will measure the average treatment effect.
4.2 Results: Vietnam War Marriage Deferments
Figures 3 through 6 present results from the above model as graphs of the predicted proba-
bility of marriage by age. Figure 3 compares the predicted hazard of marriage during peace-
time, with a marriage deferment, the dotted line, and without a marriage deferment, the
solid line. Figures 4 through 6 compare the predicted hazard of marriage during wartime,
with a marriage deferment, the dotted line, and without a marriage deferment, the solid
line.15
Figure 3 illustrates the acceleration of marriage as a result of the deferment during peace-
time. Specifically, it increases the probability of marriage at age 20, 21 and 23 by 9, 13 and
11%. As expected the effect of the deferment is stronger during wartime, when men are
both more vulnerable to the draft and face a higher cost to being drafted. During wartime,
the probability of marriage at age 20 and 21 increase by 11 and 15%, respectively. For all
other ages the effect is negative or insignificant. These results show that the deferment had
a positive and significant effect on men in the draft eligible age range. Furthermore, given
15Coefficients and standard errors for the specification run on white men and graphs with confidences
intervals can be found in the appendix of the paper.
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Figure 4: The Effect is Stronger During Wartime
Figure 5: The Effect is Strongest for Men without a College Education
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Figure 6: There is No Effect for Men with a College Education
Figure 7: The Effect of the Marriage Deferment is Mirrored for Women
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that men were inducted eldest first into the draft and the median age of induction was be-
tween 21 and 22 years old at the time, the effect is strongest for those ages most vulnerable
to the draft.
During the Vietnam War, men could avoid the draft by attending college and qualifying for
student deferments. Thus, for men who attended college, the availability of the marriage
deferment should have no effect on the timing of marriage. This can be seen in Figure 5.
In contrast, Figure 6 reveals a strong and significant effect of the marriage deferment on
men who did not attend college. For these men that were most vulnerable to the draft the
marriage deferment had the strongest effect, increasing the probability of marriage at age
21 by 24%.
Although women were not liable for induction into the draft, the marriage deferment is
likely to have an indirect effect on their timing of marriage. The effects of the deferment
for men are mirrored when looking at the hazards for women. Figure 7 shows that the
availability of the marriage deferment accelerated the timing of marriage for women in a
range of ages around those of men. Specifically, the marriage deferment led to a significant
increase in the probability of marriage for women 18 to 22 years old, for instance increasing
the probability of marriage at age 19 by 13%.
4.3 Results: Korean War and WWII Marriage Deferments
As a robustness check, I use an unbalanced panel of years 1935-1960 created using 1960
Census data to estimate the same hazard model using the Korean War and WWII marriage
deferments for identification. The Korean War deferments were enacted and repealed in
much the same way as the Vietnam War deferments. The qualitative results show that
the effects are the same. The marriage deferment accelerated marriage for men, with the
strongest effect for men with no college education and no effect for men with a college
education. These effects are mirrored for women.16 The results from the World War II
marriage deferment differ on one important dimension – the age of liability. During World
War II the age of liability was 21-31 years old for the years 1940-1941, and 21-36 years
old for 1942-1943. Consequently the results show that the effect of the deferment is not
limited to 19-25 years olds as it was for the Vietnam and Korean War deferments. Instead
the effect of the deferment is concentrated on those 23-30 from 1940-41 and for those 23-32
for 1942-1943.17
The results presented in this section show that marriage deferments accelerated the timing
of marriage for young men and women during the VietnamWar, the Korean War and World
War II. The effects of these deferments were restricted to those men within the draft eligible
age range. In addition these effects were strongest during wartime and for those men most
16Graphical results can be found in the appendix, Figure 14, Figure 15, Figure 16, Figure 17 & Figure 18
17Graphical results can be found in the appendix, Figures 19 and 20
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vulnerable to the draft. These findings suggest that marriage deferments had strong effects
on the timing of marriage and that these effects are robust to different cohorts and ages of
liability.
5 Probability of Marriage: Estimation and Results
In the previous section, the results showed that marriage deferments accelerated the timing
of marriage. However, the question remains whether these are accelerated marriages or
marginal marriages. In other words would the men induced into marriage by the deferment
have married by age 30 without the marriage deferment?18
5.1 Framework
The propensity to marry by age 30 for person, i, can be characterized by the following
equation:
M⇤i = Eibi+Xig+ui (2)
Mi =
⇢
1 if M⇤i > 0
0 if M⇤i  0
whereM⇤i is the propensity to marry,Mi is an indicator for being married, Ei is an indicator
for exposure to the marriage deferment, Xi is a set of controls, and ui are the unobservables.
Equation (2) is a heterogenous treatment effects model and can be rewritten as
M⇤i = Eib¯+Xig+ ei (3)
where b¯ is the average of bi and ei=(bi  b¯)Ei+ui. Within this framework, if the treatment,
Ei and the unobservables, ei, are conditionally independent and there is universal treatment
given the control variables, a logit model of the above propensity to be married by age 30
will estimate the average treatment effect.19 In other words, one must assume ei?Ei|Xi.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
I estimate the effect of the marriage deferment on the probability of marriage by age 30
using a logit model with the following specification forM⇤i
M⇤i = EibM+FDibF +WaribW +Xi(t)0bx (4)
18Over 87% of my sample is married by age 30 and only another 4% will marry at older ages.
19Universal treatment means that a person, i, does not select into treatment based on differential benefits
from treatment.
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Table 1: Probability of Marriage: Descriptive Statistics
Men
Variable MD Cohort Control Cohort
Age 37.90 36.54
College 0.45 0.49
Veteran 0.40 0.45
Urban 0.68 0.69
South 0.29 0.29
Wage 8.80 8.26
Labor Force 0.96 0.96
Married 0.87 0.85
# Obs. 486069 487375
where Ei is an indicator for being age 19-25 during the Vietnam War marriage deferment,
FDi is an indicator for being age 19-25 during the Vietnam War fatherhood deferment,
Wari is an indicator for being age 19-25 during the Vietnam War, and Xi includes a set
of controls for a trend in cohort, state dummies, and an indicator for urban/rural. In the
previous section, the hazard model estimates the effect of being exposed to the policy at
a point in time. In this section, in order to identify whether the deferment encouraged
marginal marriages, the model estimates the effect of ever being exposed to the marriage
deferment on the probability of marrying by age 30. Exposure to the policy, Ei, is defined
by cohort, all men who were 19-25 years old, between September 1963-August 1965 are
considered exposed to the policy.20
As previously stated, the effect of exposure to the marriage deferment will be consistently
estimated if conditional independence holds. Since I condition on a trend in cohort, ex-
posure to the Vietnam War, and exposure to the fatherhood deferment, the effect of the
marriage deferment is identified off deviations from a cohort trend. One must assume that
control variables capture all other cross cohort variation in the probability of marriage.21
To estimate this model, I create a dataset which includes the 8 cohorts that were exposed
to the marriage deferment and 4 cohorts born before and 4 cohorts born after.22 In Table 1,
the descriptive statistics are presented for the two groups of men.23
20Specifically, those born between the first quarter of 1938 and the third quarter of 1946 will be considered
eligible.
21For instance, those exposed would be 19-25 during the early to mid 1960s, the beginning of the “cultural
decade”. The model requires assuming that this did not have an effect on the probability of marriage.
22The qualitative results are not sensitive to expansion or contraction of the control group, nor are they
sensitive to the exclusion of the 4 cohorts before or after those exposed to the marriage deferments.
23The differences in means are statistically significant for all variables in Table 1.
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Table 2: Probability of Marriage: Marginal Effects
Education
Variable Men College No College
MD 0.007** 0.005 0.007***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
War 0.006 0.010 0.003
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005)
FD 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.009***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Urban Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 906031 415954 490077
***Significant at 1% Level, **Significant at 5% Level, *Significant at 10% Level
5.3 Results
Table 2 presents the results for all men and separately by education. The marriage de-
ferment increased the probability of marriage by approximately 0.7 percentage points or
1%. This implies that the marriage deferment not only accelerated marriage but induced
marginal marriages. The effect of exposure to the marriage deferment on men who did not
attend college is large and significant, while the effect on men who did attend college is
insignificant. These results suggest, again, that exposure to the marriage deferment had the
strongest impact on those men most vulnerable to the draft. The results presented in this
section suggest that the marriage deferment induced some men to marry who otherwise
would not have married.
The fatherhood deferment also had a positive and significant effect on the probability of
marriage. The fatherhood deferment was available for the 4 years after the marriage de-
ferment was repealed, the most intense years of the Vietnam War. It required that men
both have a child and be married and appears to have encouraged marriage on its own. In
addition, the Vietnam War appears to have had a positive but insignificant effect on the
probability of marriage.24
This section present results which show that the VietnamWar marriage deferment increased
the probability of marriage by age 30. This implies that the marriage deferment induced
marginal marriages.
24This is consistent with results found in the previous section, see Figure 10.
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6 Probability of Divorce: Estimation and Results
The previous two sections have demonstrated that the marriage deferment both acceler-
ated the timing of marriage and induced marginal marriages. Theory suggests that these
marginal marriages will be more likely to end in divorce because they produce smaller
gains to marriage. This hypothesis can be tested by looking at the effect of the marriage
deferment on the probability of divorce.
6.1 Framework
The reduced form propensity to divorce by 1980 for person i can be characterized by the
following:
D⇤i = EibDi +XigD+uDi (5)
Di =
⇢
1 if D⇤i > 0 and Mi = 1
0 if D⇤i  0 and Mi = 1
where D⇤i is the propensity to divorce, Mi is an indicator for being married determined
by Equation (2), Di is an indicator for being divorced, Ei is an indicator for exposed to
the deferment, Xi is a set of controls, and uDi are the unobservables. Equation (5) can be
rewritten as
D⇤i = Eib¯D+Xig+ eDi (6)
where b¯D is the average of bDi and eDi = (bi  b¯)Ei+ui. In this framework, estimation of b¯
will suffer from selection bias even when conditional independence and universal treatment
are assumed. Only those men with the highest benefit from the deferment will marry as a
result of the deferment, i.e. only those with bi greater than some threshold b˜. Thus, bD
will estimate the average effect for those men. One must make the strong assumption that
eDi ?ei|Xi and eDi ?Ei|Xi in order to interpret the reduced form estimation of b¯D as an average
treatment effect.
6.2 Estimation Strategy
I estimate the effect of the marriage deferment on the probability of divorce by age 30 using
a logit model with the following specification for D⇤i
D⇤i =MDigM+FDigF +WarigWt +Xi(t)0bx (7)
whereMDi is an indicator for being age 19-25 during the VietnamWar marriage deferment,
FDi is an indicator for being age 19-25 during the VietnamWar fatherhood deferment,Wari
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is an indicator for being age 19-25 during the VietnamWar, and Xi includes a set of controls
for a trend in cohort, state dummies and an indicator for urban/rural.
In this model as in the probability of marriage model, the effect of the marriage deferment
is identified by across cohort variation. Again, I control for a trend in cohort, exposure
to the Vietnam War and exposure to the fatherhood deferment. Controlling for exposure
to the fatherhood deferment, FDi is especially important in this estimation. In August of
1965, when the Vietnam War marriage deferment was repealed, President Johnson had as-
sured men who had married prior to the repeal that they could keep their deferments as
long as they remained married. In October 1965, however, he announced that all married
men would be eligible for induction regardless of the date of marriage. These men had two
options, allow themselves to be inducted or obtain another deferment. Kutinova (2009)
finds that many of these men chose to have children in order to obtain a fatherhood defer-
ment and avoid induction. Having children may increase the cost of divorce, and therefore
decrease the probability of divorce. This may dampen any effects of the marriage defer-
ment on divorce. As a consequence it is important control for exposure to the fatherhood
deferment.
As previously stated in Section 6.1, the estimates of the effect of exposure to the deferment
will likely include selection bias. In addition, these estimates may measure a combination
of the effect of entering a marginal marriage and avoiding the draft. A man who marries as
a result of the deferment could not have been drafted until at least October 1965 when the
draft began inducting married men. The estimate of the effect of exposure to the marriage
deferment may, therefore, combine the effects of not being drafted and being induced into
marriage. Given these considerations, the results in this section are best interpreted as
descriptive.25
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for married individuals from the same sample as in
Table 1. Comparing Table 1 and Table 3, the descriptive statistics for the two groups
are very similar. This table includes the additional variables for whether a person has
children and whether a person is divorced. It appears that those exposed to the marriage
deferment were more likely to have children. As previously stated this may be the result of
the fatherhood deferment.
6.3 Results
Table 4 presents the results for the divorce regression for all men and separately for men by
education. In contrast to the previous literature and what is predicted by theory, exposure to
the marriage deferment is correlated with a lower probability of divorce by 0.2 percentage
points or 1%. This correlation is largest for men who did not attend college, those most
affected by the marriage deferment. In contrast the effect for men who did attend college is
25In this paper I do not attempt to control for selection, this is left to a forthcoming paper.
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Table 3: Probability of Divorce: Descriptive Statistics
Men
Variable MD Cohort Control Cohort
Age 37.94 36.84
College 0.45 0.48
Veteran 0.40 0.47
Urban 0.68 0.68
South 0.30 0.30
Wage 8.90 8.40
Labor Force 0.97 0.97
Divorced 0.11 0.11
Child 0.81 0.75
# Obs 449124 434879
Table 4: Probability of Divorce: Marginal Effects
Education
Variable Men College No College
MD -0.002* 0.001 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
War 0.004*** 0.001 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
FD -0.003*** 0.000 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Cohort Trend Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 823025 371928 451097
***Significant at 1% Level, **Significant at 5% Level, *Significant at 10% Level
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insignificant. These results suggest that for those exposed to the marriage deferment, men
most vulnerable to the draft and those most likely to be induced to marry, were the least
likely to divorce.
One possible explanation for this result is that the marriage deferment is measuring a com-
bination of the effect of not being drafted and being induced to marry. By definition those
men who took advantage of the marriage deferment were ineligible to be drafted. Men who
were not inducted into service and therefore not veterans, may be less likely to divorce be-
cause they have not been traumatized by war. This would be consistent with work presented
in Zax and Flueck (2003) & Hogan and Seifert (2008), which shows that veterans are more
likely to divorce.
Another possible explanation is selection into marriage. For instance, those who are risk
averse will value the certainty of the marriage deferment to the uncertainty of being drafted.
These men will also be less likely to get divorced, preferring the certainty of married life
to the uncertainty of reentering the marriage market. The second possible explanation is
diminishing marginal utility. With diminishing marginal utility, men who have low utility
from being single, will value the marriage deferment more highly than other men. These
men will also be less likely to divorce. The results presented in this section show that those
exposed to the marriage deferment, although more likely to marry, are less likely to get
divorced.
Exposure to war alone during the ages of liability is associated with an increase in the prob-
ability of divorce. This is consistent with previous research which suggests that veterans
are more likely to get divorced (Zax and Flueck 2003 and Hogan and Seifert 2008). The
fatherhood deferment is associated with a lower probability of divorce. Marriage specific
investments, such as children, lower the probability of divorce according to theory; thus, a
policy which encourages couples to have more children should decrease the probability of
divorce.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I attempt to answer two questions. First, can government policies influence
the marital decisions of individuals? I find that some government policies with sufficiently
strong incentives can have a large and significant effect on marriage. Specifically, the
marriage deferment increased the probability of marriage for 21 year olds by 15% and the
overall probability of marriage by 1%. This translates to more than 17,000 early marriages
at age 21 and 68,000 extra marriages. These results suggest that although individuals’
marital decisions are responsive to incentives, large incentives are required in order to affect
them in any substantial way. Second, do these policies induce unstable marriages? I find
that the marriage deferment is associated with a decrease in the probability of divorce.
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Table 5: Coefficient Estimates, Vietnam War Era, White Men, 1956-1980
Age betat bWt bMDt bWt +bMDt
17 -0.077* -0.336*** 0.001
(0.040) (0.091) (0.076)
18 0.908*** 0.038 -0.099** -0.219***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.051) (0.050)
19 1.474*** 0.002 0.030 -0.004
(0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040)
20 1.841*** 0.001 0.094*** 0.104***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036)
21 2.119*** 0.021 0.129*** 0.157***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.033)
22 2.290 *** 0.064*** 0.057 0.040
(0.023) (0.026) (0.036) (0.035)
23 2.313*** 0.103*** 0.112*** 0.034
(0.023) (0.026) (0.039) (0.038)
24 2.300 *** 0.115*** -0.025 -0.078*
(0.024) (0.027) (0.045) (0.044)
25 2.306*** 0.074*** -0.018 0.034
(0.024) (0.028) (0.049) (0.047)
26 2.278*** 0.013 0.088* 0.032
(0.025) (0.030) (0.052) (0.053)
27 2.199*** 0.004 0.017 0.024
(0.026) (0.032) (0.060) (0.061)
28 2.095*** 0.041 0.003 -0.014
(0.027) (0.035) (0.068) (0.069)
29 2.020*** -0.061 0.047 0.086
(0.028) (0.038) (0.075) (0.076)
30 1.909*** -0.027 -0.060 0.054
(0.030) (0.041) (0.085) (0.088)
31 1.800*** 0.011 -0.207** 0.032
(0.031) (0.045) (0.100) (0.093)
32 1.664*** 0.018 -0.007 -0.250**
(0.034) (0.049) (0.098) (0.116)
N=9,046,901 ***Significant at 1% Level, **Significant at 5% Level, *Significant at 10% Level
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9 Appendix A1 
Characteristics of Spousal Immigrants by Admission Category Analysis 
uses NIS 2003 data for adults over the age of 18, excluding refugees, 
asylees and legalizations 
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Figure'2:'All'Spousal'Immigrants'vs.'Spouses'of'Legal'Permanent'Residents''
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Figure'3:'All'Spousal'Immigrants'vs.'Parents'of'US'Citizens'
!
Figure'4:'All'Spousal'Immigrants'vs.'Spouses'of'Siblings'of'US'Citizens'
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Figure'5:'All'Spousal'Immigrants'vs.'Spouses'of'Employment'Preference'Immigrants'
!
Figure'6:'All'Spousal'Immigrants'vs.'Spouses'of'Diversity'Preference'Immigrants'
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Figure'7:'All'Spousal'Immigrants'vs.'Spouses'of'Married'Children'of'US'Citizens'
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10# Appendix#A2:!
Characteristics!of!Spousal!Immigrants!Compared!to!Their!Spouses!by!Admission!
Category.!Analysis!uses!NIS!2003!data!for!adults!over!the!age!of!17,!excluding!refugees,!
asylees!and!legalizations
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Figure#1:#Native#U.S.#Citizens#!
!
Figure#2:#Naturalized#US#Citizens#
!
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Figure#3:#Legal#Permanent#Residents#
#
#
Figure#4:#Parents#of#US#Citizens#
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Figure#5:##Siblings#of#US#Citizens#
!
Figure#6:#Employment#Preference#Immigrants#
!
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Figure#7:#Diversity#Preference##
!
Figure#8:#Married#Children#of#US#Citizens#
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11 Appendix A3 
Double!Employment!Quota.!Analysis!uses!NIS!2003!data!for!adults!over!
the!age!of!17,!excluding!refugees,!asylees!and!legalizations!
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Figure'1:'Distribution'of'Immigrant'Characteristics:'Double'Employment'Quota'
!
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'
Figure'2:'Distribution'of'Immigrant'Characteristics:'Distribution'of'Immigrant'Characteristics:'Double'Employment'Quota''
'
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12 Appendix A4!
Accompanying!Spouses!and!Children!Do!Not!Count!Against!The!Quota.!Analysis!
uses!NIS!2003!data!for!adults!over!the!age!of!17,!excluding!refugees,!asylees!and!
legalizations
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Figure!1:!Distribution!of!Immigrant!Characteristics:!Double!Accompanying!Spouses!and!Children!Do!Not!Count!Against!the!
Quota!
!
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!
Figure!2:!Distribution!of!Immigrant!Characteristics:!Accompanying!Spouses!and!Children!Do!Not!Count!Against!the!Quota!
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